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Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial
Hospital and its Legacy
Mitchell J. Wiet*
September 29, 2005, will mark the fortieth anniversary of the Illinois
Supreme Court's landmark decision in the case of Darling v. Charleston
Community Memorial Hospital.' This paper examines the impact that
Darling and its progeny have had and continue to have on hospital liability
over the last four decades. Part I is an analysis of the holdings in the
Illinois Appellate Court and Supreme Court decisions themselves. Part II
demonstrates Darling's impact on hospital agency liability theory. Part III
identifies other changes in hospital liability jurisprudence effected and
foreshadowed by Darling.
INTRODUCTION
In the view of the author, the Darling decision was the "Big Bang" event
that, in an instant, gave rise to a totally new and still expanding universe of
hospital liability theory.2 The basic facts of the Darling case are truly
unremarkable, yet its impact has been profound and transformative of
hospital liability theory.
On the surface, the Darling decision merely affirmed a $110,000
judgment against a rural, fifty-bed hospital in downstate Illinois as
compensation for a leg amputation resulting from improper casting of a
broken leg and the medically mismanaged infection that ensued. Yet the
Darling case has been cited to date in over 340 state and federal cases,
* Mitchell J. Wiet is the former Vice President and General Counsel of Northwestern
Memorial Hospital and its corporate system, having retired from this position after almost
twenty years at the end of 1999. Since retiring, Mr. Wiet has served as an independent
consultant in the health care field to various clients, including Northwestern Memorial. He
is a member of the board of directors of NMIC, Northwestern Memorial's offshore captive
insurance entity.
1. 211 N.E.2d 253 (Ill. 1965).
2. The author found the eighty-four page Illinois Appellate Court decision (Darling v.
Charleston Cmty. Mem'l Hosp., 200 NE.2d 149 (I11. App. Ct. 1964)) more illuminating than
the fourteen page Darling Illinois Supreme Court decision (211 N.E.2d at 257) and therefore
relies additionally on the Illinois Appellate Court's analysis in his discussion of the Darling
paradigm.
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including 32 Illinois Supreme Court cases, 166 Illinois Appellate Court
cases, 57 other state supreme court (or equivalent court) cases and 59 other
state appellate court cases encompassing the great majority of this country's
state court jurisdictions.3 To date, it has also been the subject of, or
referenced in, an additional 389 law review articles, monographs, treatises,
etc. 4 The reasons for such prolific citation are set forth below.
I. RADICAL CHANGES IN HOSPITAL LIABILITY THEORY EFFECTED BY THE
DARLING DECISION: THE "NEW" POST-1965 PARADIGM
The Darling decision effected two radical changes in hospital liability
jurisprudence. The first is the extension of direct liability theory to hospital
entities in their role as providers of care. The second has to do with what
can constitute competent evidence of the duties of care owed by a provider-
hospital directly to its patients which, if found to have been violated, can
result in direct liability for the hospital.
No court prior to Darling had ever enunciated either of these two radical
elements, much less ever combined them. Before Darling, there was no
equivalent in the American jurisprudence of hospital liability for either of
these elements. Then the Darling Big Bang occurred, giving rise to a new
and still expanding universe of hospital liability theory.
A. Hospital Direct Liability
At the core of the Illinois Supreme Court's decision is its holding, for the
first time ever, that hospital entities themselves, acting through both their
employees and independent (non-employed) medical staff members,
undertake to treat patients and that in their capacity as providers of care,
hospitals owe separate duties of care to their patients directly (hence, "direct
liability") which, if violated, will result in liability for the hospital entity.5
These direct duties of care owed by hospitals are in addition to the vicarious
liability exposures hospitals have under the doctrine of respondeat superior
for their agents' breaches of other independent duties of care owed by those
agents to patients (typically having to do with the standards of hands-on
medical or clinical care).
The methodology employed by the Illinois Supreme Court in reaching
this result is interesting. The court cited Bing v. Thunig for the proposition
that hospital entities undertake to treat patients through their doctors and
3. See LEXIS SHEPARD'S, http://www.lexisnexis.com (last visited Apr. 14, 2005)
(enumerating the various jurisdictions that have cited the Illinois Supreme Court's decision
in Darling).
4. SHEPARD'S, supra note 3.
5. Darling, 211 N.E.2d at 257.
[Vol. 14400
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nurses.6 The Bing court reached this conclusion after finding that health
care as delivered by hospitals in 1957 had become a big business and did
not merely furnish facilities where health care professionals acted on their
own responsibility. 7 However, Bing's central finding became the premise
for vastly expanding a New York hospital's vicarious liability exposure.8
The Illinois Supreme Court adopted Bing's rationale and found that
hospitals had likewise become big businesses in Illinois by 1965. However,
the court used Bing as the premise for its first-ever direct liability holding,
not vicarious liability.9
B. Hospitals' Separate Direct Duties of Care
The Darling court next addressed the issue of what constitutes competent
evidence of the separate duties of care owed directly to patients by hospitals
as providers. 10 The Darling court responded as follows:
In the present case the regulations, standards, and bylaws which the
plaintiff introduced into evidence, performed much the same function as
did evidence of custom. This evidence aided the jury in deciding what
was feasible and what the defendant knew or should have known. It did
not conclusively determine the standard of care and the jury was not
instructed that it did ....
The Standards for Hospital Accreditation, the state licensing regulations
and the defendant's bylaws demonstrate that the medical profession and
other responsible authorities regard it as both desirable and feasible that a
hospital assume certain responsibilities for the care of the patient."
In the author's view, it is this element of the Darling decision that
constitutes the most radical change concerning direct liability. Before
Darling, there was no equivalent for this element either. It has given rise to
a virtually limitless evidentiary base for hospitals' (and now other
providers') duties of care to patients, given the all-encompassing scope and
the sheer number of accreditation standards set forth by the Joint
Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO), as
well as hospital licensing standards. There are endless variations in these
state and local equivalent licensing regulations, not to mention the unique
6. Id.
7. Id. (citing Bing v. Thunig, 143 N.E.2d 3, 8 (N.Y. 1957)).
8. Bing, 143 N.E.2d at 11-12.
9. Darling, 211 N.E.2d at 257.
10. Id.
11. Id.
2005]
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provisions in corporate and medical staff bylaws, as well as other
documents deemed relevant by the courts over time. It is precisely this
virtually infinite number of evidentiary variations, more than any other
feature of the Darling decision, which drives the ever-expanding nature of
the new hospital liability paradigm set off by Darling's 1965 Big Bang.
A more recent example of this still expanding "universe" is Jones v.
Chicago HMO Ltd., in which Darling's direct liability theory was extended
to Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs). 12 The issue decided in that
case dealt with the reasonableness of HMO physician patient load limits.
Among the documents admitted into evidence were HMO accreditation
standards, HMO entity and plan documents, and physician provider
agreements.13
As exemplified by the Darling decision, it is legally sufficient to affirm a
judgment if only one of the total number of duties found by the jury to have
been violated can be sustained on appeal. Of the thirty or so duty of care
issues submitted to the Darling jury, only two were focused on and
sustained by the Illinois Supreme Court: (a) nurse staffing inadequacy or
incompetence; and (b) failure to review the plaintiffs medical case while
hospitalized. 14 For defendant hospitals, this harsh legal reality lends a
particularly lethal characteristic to the post-1965 Darling paradigm.
The illuminating Darling Illinois Appellate Court decision highlighted
the following as relevant evidentiary sources from which the jury could
discern the defendant hospital's duties of care: (a) Illinois Hospital
Licensing Act regulations promulgated by the Illinois Department of Public
Health (IDPH) addressing the hospital governing board's responsibilities
for employing "competent and well qualified personnel in adequate
numbers" and of requiring "that the medical staff function in conformity
with reasonable standards of competency;' 5 (b) IDPH medical staff bylaws
content regulations requiring clear standards for medical consultations,
experience-based determinations for granting practice privileges, and
regular and ongoing review of "clinical experience" based on patient
medical records; 16 (c) JCAH (now JCAHO) nursing-department
accreditation standards requiring that nurses "function in close relationship
with other services of the hospital, both administrative and professional;"' 7
(d) JCAH nursing department hospital accreditation standards requiring "an
adequate number of professional nurses and ancillary personnel for bedside
12. 730 N.E.2d at 1128.
13. Id. at 1132-33.
14. See Darling, 211 N.E.2d at 163-66.
15. Id. at 163.
16. Id. at 164.
17. Id. at 165.
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care;" 18 (e) JCAH governing body accreditation standards requiring the
appointment of qualified and competent medical staff members;19 (f) JCAH
medical staff accreditation standards placing overall responsibility for the
quality of medical care on the organized medical staff as a whole, requiring
"constant analysis and review of the clinical work done in the hospital," as
well as clear criteria for medical consultations; 20 (g) Charleston Community
Memorial Hospital's medical staff bylaws provisions which "ensured the
best possible care" as part of its purposes statement; 21 (h) vague defendant
hospital medical staff bylaws provisions requiring medical consultations "in
all major cases in which the patient is not a good risk or should the
diagnosis appear to be obscure; '22 and (i) medical staff bylaws provisions
requiring emergency coverage on an organized rotation basis.23
II. DARLING'S IMPACT ON HOSPITAL AGENCY LIABILITY THEORY
Before Darling, the doctrine of respondeat superior was alive and well
and was applied on occasion to impose hospital agency liability, albeit
under some very narrow and highly limited circumstances.24 The prevailing
judicial view of hospitals well into the twentieth century was that as legal
entities, hospitals were essentially charitable trusts and were therefore
deserving of special treatment under the law in order to prevent what would
25otherwise be the inappropriate diversion of charitable trust assets.
By the 1950s, the courts had fashioned and adopted a number of factors
or circumstances, which, if proven to exist in a given case, rendered agency
liability theory inapplicable to the defendant hospital. Among these factors
were: (a) the view that hospitals merely provided facilities in which health
care professionals (including employed nurses) acted therein on their own
responsibility; 26 (b) the distinction between "medical" and "administrative"
acts under which, generally speaking, hospital agency liability could result
only in the case of the latter; (c) generally, hospitals were not even held
liable for the "medical" acts of their employed nurses; (d) the "captain of
the ship" doctrine insulated hospitals from agency liability resulting from
the acts or omissions of attending physicians or surgeons as well as other
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Darling, 211 N.E.2d at 164-65.
21. Id. at 165.
22. Id.
23. See id. at 166.
24. Bing, 143 N.E.2d at 3; See also Shloendorffv. Soc'y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 95
(N.Y. 1914).
25. Bing, 143 N.E.2d at 5-6; See also Shloendorff 105 N.E. at 95.
26. Bing, 143 N.E.2d at 8.
2005]
5
Wiet: Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hospital and Its Legacy
Published by LAW eCommons, 2005
Annals of Health Law
health care professionals deemed to be acting under their direction; and (e)
hospital agency liability for the acts or omissions of independent (non-
employed) physicians was virtually unheard of.27
The landmark case of Bing v. Thunig exemplifies the sea-change in
hospital agency liability theory that was then beginning to occur, some
eight years prior to Darling.28  As stated in Part I above, the Illinois
Supreme Court cited Bing and adopted its finding that health care had
evolved into just another form of big business, no longer deserving of
special treatment by the courts.
The Bing court first reviewed, then abolished, a number of the pre-
existing hospital agency liability insulating factors.29 It then simply
extended to hospitals the same two-part agency liability test or query as for
any other employer: (a) whether the negligent actor was an employee of the
hospital; and (b) if so, whether the negligent act or omission occurred in the
course and scope of that employment. 30 This was a liability theory based on
actual agency, or agency-in-fact, not the apparent or ostensible agency
liability theory for hospitals which would come some years later.3'
The end result reached in Darling was the establishment for the first time
ever of the rule of direct hospital liability, not the extension to hospitals of
the general principles of agency liability based on actual agency or
employment.32 How then can it be said that Darling also had an impact on
hospital agency liability theory?
The answer is that both of these disparate end results are rooted in the
same Bing rationale cited with approval and relied upon by the Darling
court, namely:
The conception that the hospital does not undertake to treat the patient,
does not undertake to act through its doctors and nurses, but undertakes
instead simply to procure them to act upon their own responsibility, no
longer reflects the fact. Present-day hospitals, as their manner of
operation plainly demonstrates, do far more than furnish facilities for
treatment. They regularly employ on a salary basis a large staff of
physicians, nurses and interns, as well as administrative and manual
workers, and they charge patients for medical care and treatment,
collecting for such services, if necessary, by legal action. Certainly, the
person who avails himself of 'hospital facilities' expects that the hospital
will attempt to cure him, not that its nurses or other employees will act on
27. See id. at 4, 6 (summarizing Schloendorff supra note 24).
28. Id. at 3.
29. Id. at 5-9.
30. Id. at 8.
31. See Bing, 143 N.E.2d at 8.
32. See id.
[Vol. 14
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their own responsibility.
33
In the author's view, the Darling court implicitly endorsed Bing's
abolition of the pre-existing insulating circumstances for hospital agency
liability, but went beyond Bing to establish for the first time ever the rule of
hospital direct liability. Thus, the Darling court endorsed two separate and
distinct theories of hospital liability that are complementary and not
mutually exclusive: direct hospital liability, and implicitly, hospital agency
liability based on employment or actual agency.
The above excerpt from the Bing decision relied upon by the Darling
court in imposing direct liability foreshadows elements of hospital apparent
agency (ostensible agency) that emerged later.34 Of particular relevance are
the findings that in treating patients, hospitals act through their doctors and
nurses and that patients "expect" that the hospital will attempt to cure them,
not that nurses or physicians working there are acting on their own
responsibility. 35  This shift in perspective to what the patient may
reasonably expect in receiving hospital-based care is the very bedrock of
hospital apparent or ostensible agency liability over and above hospital
agency-in-fact liability.
36
The emergence of apparent agency as a fully developed hospital liability
theory occurred post-Darling. The exemplar Illinois case is Gilbert v.
Sycamore Municipal Hospital,3 7 which liberally referenced and relied upon
Kashishian v. Port.38 The Gilbert court identified the elements of hospital
apparent agency liability as: (a) the hospital holding itself out as the
provider of care; (b) the patient reasonably believing that the independent
physician rendering care to him or her is the hospital's agent; and (c)
justifiable reliance on such belief to the patient's detriment.39 The first two
elements, at least, perhaps in a more rudimentary form, can be found in the
above excerpt from Darling.4 °
Gilbert and Darling have the following common decisional findings: 1)
hospitals are deemed big businesses, not charitable institutions as in the
past;41 2) hospitals act through their doctors in treating patients;42 and 3)
patients naturally assume that physicians unfamiliar to them are hospital
33. See Darling, 211 N.E.2d at 257 (quoting Bing, 143 N.E.2d at 8).
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. 622 N.E.2d 788, 793-94 (I11. 1993).
38. 481 N.W.2d 277, 282 (Wis. 1992).
39. Gilbert, 622 N.E.2d at 795.
40. Darling, 211 N.E.2d at 257 (quoting Bing, 143 N.E.2d at 8).
41. See Gilbert, 622 N.E.2d at 793; Darling, 211 N.E.2d at 263.
42. See Gilbert, 622 N.E.2d at 793; Darling, 211 N.E.2d at 257.
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employees and are not acting on their own responsibility as independent
contractors.43
III. OTHER CHANGES EFFECTED OR FORESHADOWED BY DARLING
A. Abolition of Charitable Immunity for Hospitals in Illinois
The judicially-created doctrine of charitable immunity originally
exempted all the assets of "charitable institutions," including hospitals,
from the reach of judgment creditors as an impermissible diversion under
principles of charitable trust law.44 Before Darling, the Illinois Supreme
Court permitted limited recovery, but only against commercial insurance
coverage limits, if any.45 The Darling court eliminated altogether the last
vestiges of this immunity doctrine, but with prospective effect only, except
for the defendant hospital.46
B. Abolition of the So Called "Hotel Defense "for Hospitals
Before Darling, the "hotel defense" was based on the premise that
hospitals as entities did not undertake to treat patients. Instead, hospitals
merely undertook to provide facilities and procure professionals who acted
on their own responsibility for the most part. The Darling court, citing
Bing v. Thunig,47 squarely held that hospitals treated patients acting through
their employed nurses and medical staff.
48
C. Creation of Personal Liability Exposures
Hospital directors, managers, and medical staff members are among
those exposed to personal liability. Personal liability arises under the
various accreditation and licensing standards and regulations establishing
explicit duties owed by directors, managers, and organized medical staff,
which, if not complied with, will bring personal liability for these
individuals in addition to the hospital's separate direct liability. While used
infrequently, these personal exposures are very real.49
43. See Gilbert, 622 N.E.2d at 794; Darling, 211 N.E.2d at 257.
44. See Bing, 143 N.E.2d at 7; Schloendorff, 105 N.E.2d at 95.
45. See Molitor v. Kaneland Cmty. Sch. Dist. No. 302, 182 N.E.2d 145, 147 (Ill. 1962).
46. Darling, 211 N.E.2d at 260.
47. Bing, 43 N.E.2d at 8.
48. Darling, 211 N.E.2d at 257.
49. See Part II, supra, for how these standards and regulations may be used as evidence
of the duties of care owed to patients.
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D. "Chain of Command" Failures
Darling foreshadowed so-called "chain of command" failures as an
additional basis for hospital agency liability. One of the two grounds on
which the Darling court's affirmance was based was the nursing staffs
failure to bring the plaintiffs leg infection to the attention of hospital
administration and medical staff in order to rectify the condition.50 Chain of
command failures as a fully developed liability theory would emerge much
later.5'
E. Teeth for the JCAHO
A very positive effect of Darling was to confirm and strengthen the role
of JCAHO as an accrediting body and to give teeth to its accreditation
standards, especially those relating to quality management, peer review, and
medical staff credentialing. The same can be said of equivalent state and
local hospital licensing regulations. From 1965 forward, hospitals
understood that non-compliance with these standards would bring with it
exposure to substantial liabilities as well. Compliance made a quantum
leap, albeit for negative motives.
F. Hospital Professional Liability Insurance Crises
Darling was a significant factor for subsequent cyclical crises in the
hospital professional liability (HPL) market. The rule of direct hospital
liability, announced for the first time in Darling, eventually touched off the
first of several HPL insurance crises beginning in the 1970s. These crises
deepened as Darling's imposition of direct liability was adopted by more
and more state court jurisdictions.
G. Imputability of Knowledge of Peer Review Information
In an extreme factual situation, the Darling rationale was used to expand
a hospital's corporate responsibility for quality of care by imputing to the
hospital knowledge of all material facts that could have been discovered in
the course of medical staff credentialing 2
50. Darling, 211 N.E.2d at 258.
51. Holton v. Mem'l Hosp., 679 N.E.2d 1202, 1208-09 (1997). Repeated failure of
defendant hospital's nursing staff to timely and accurately report plaintiff's decline into
paresis was deemed to have been the proximate cause of preventing attending physicians
from correctly diagnosing and timely and efficaciously treating plaintiffs condition. The
evidence supported the jury's verdict against the defendant hospital based on agency liability
theory. The case was ultimately remanded for a new trial on other grounds.
52. See Johnson v. Misericordia Cmty. Hosp., 301 N.W. 2d 156, 175 (Wis. 1981). An
applicant for a medical staff appointment to a hospital lacking JCAHO accreditation lied on
2005]
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H. Offensive Uses of Darling
There is a growing number of cases in which Darling's imposition upon
hospitals of a direct duty to assume responsibility for the care of patients in
order to safeguard and improve care has been used offensively, or in sword-
like fashion.53 The Darling holding has been held to trump other colliding
rights and issues in a variety of factual settings.
Darling's core holding has been used to successfully uphold an Illinois
private (i.e. non-governmental) hospital's wide discretion in rejecting an
initial medical staff appointment application without resort to a full-blown
hearing where medical staff bylaws do not confer such rights.54 It has also
served as a basis for overturning the former judicially created "corporate
practice of medicine doctrine" which had previously prohibited the formal
employment of physicians by licensed hospitals in Illinois.5 5  Finally,
Darling has served as a basis for upholding the constitutionality (alleged
separation of powers violation) under the Illinois Constitution of year 2000
amendments to the Illinois Hospital Licensing Act. These amendments
expressly permit ex parte communications between a hospital on the one
hand, and its patients, employees, and treating medical staff members on
the other, in the context of pending or potential medical malpractice
claims.56 This holding effectively nullified the prior Petrillo case ruling
which prohibited such communications.57
CONCLUSION
The impact of Darling and its progeny over the last four decades has
transformed hospital liability jurisprudence and will likely continue to do
so. But Darling has also helped to bring about a quantum leap
improvement over time in the quality of health care in the United States.
That is a very good thing, indeed, for all health care consumers.
his application. The investigation would have revealed his prior disciplinary actions and ten
prior medical malpractice actions.
53. See infra, notes 54-56.
54. See Mauer v. Highland Park Hosp., 232 N.E.2d 776, 779 (111. App. Ct. 1967);
Barrows v. Northwestern Mem'l. Hosp., 525 N.E.2d 50, 51-52 (Ill. 1988).
55. See Berlin v. Sarah Bush Lincoln Health Ctr., 688 N.E.2d 106, 109 (Ill. 1997).
56. See Burger v. Lutheran Gen. Hosp. 759 N.E.2d 533, 549, 557-58 (I11. 2004).
57. See Petrillo v. Syntex Laboratories, Inc., 148 lll.App.3d 581, 587 (I11. App. Ct.
1986).
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